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DETERMINING JURISDICTIONAL VENUE FOR CRIMES ON 
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS  
Madeline Pinto 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The scene is all too familiar. Airline passengers cramped in narrow 
economy cabin seats in uncomfortable proximity to strangers. The 
stresses of travel have created a palpable atmosphere of heightened 
emotions, short fuses, and general irritation. Throughout the flight, one 
particularly long-legged passenger kicks the seat of the passenger in 
front of him, foiling her plans to take a nap. The female passenger turns 
around to confront her rude cabin mate, but instead of the brief 
exchange of polite apologies one expects from such an encounter, the 
conversation grows heated and one passenger strikes the other. What 
was once an ordinary commercial flight has instantly become a 
constitutional conundrum on the issue of venue.  
Venue is an essential component of every criminal defendant’s 
constitutional right to a fair trial.1 Venue is a legal term that refers to 
the place where an individual’s trial will be held.2 Drawing from their 
own experience with colonial trials in England, the Framers of the 
Constitution (“Framers”) were concerned that forcing a criminal 
defendant to be tried in an unfamiliar state would create undue 
hardship and undermine the criminal defendant’s fundamental right to 
a fair trial.3 To guard against this potential injustice, Article III of the 
Constitution mandates that all crimes be tried “in the State where the 
said Crimes shall have been committed.”4 The Sixth Amendment 
reiterates the importance of venue, requiring that “in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a … trial, by an 
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed.”5 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reflect 
this constitutional mandate, specifying that “the government must 
prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed” 
and “the court must set the place of trial within the district with due 
regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim, and the 
 
 1. United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 2. Venue, MIRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/venue 
[https://perma.cc/H7UP-UK77]. 
 3. United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice.”6 Congress has the 
power to enact individual venue statutes that pre-determine venue 
decisions for particular categories of crimes.7 However, Congress has 
exercised this power only sparingly.8 Determinations of proper venue 
for the vast majority of crimes hinge on the district in which the crime 
was committed.9 
The constitutional importance of venue in criminal prosecutions is 
clear. But thinking back to the commercial flight example, in what 
venue can the female passenger be properly tried for the assault? In 
exactly which state and district did the female passenger strike the 
male passenger as the airplane moved at high speed across the country? 
Does it even matter under these strange circumstances? Can the 
government simply prosecute the female passenger where the flight 
took off or where it landed? As the world grows increasingly 
interconnected and the frequency and volume of commercial airline 
travel skyrockets, these questions of proper venue for in-flight crimes 
will only grow in importance.10 
The federal circuit courts are split as to whether the proper venue 
for an in-flight crime is the specific district above which the crime 
occurred or any district “from, through, or into which” the flight 
moved.11 This Casenote reviews the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (“section 3237(a)”) as conferring 
venue for in-flight crimes in any district through which the flight 
traveled and the Ninth Circuit’s determination that an in-flight crime 
can be properly prosecuted only in the specific district above which 
the crime occurred.12 Part II analyzes relevant statutes and prior case 
law related to the issue of determining venue. Part III explains why the 
Ninth Circuit adopted the correct interpretation of section 3237(a).  
II. BACKGROUND  
The Supreme Court has addressed venue in a few instances. Section 
A of this part reviews the Supreme Court’s treatment of venue in 
 
 6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.  
 7. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33223, VENUE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF WHERE 
A FEDERAL CRIME MAY BE TRIED 12-14 (2018).  
 8. See id. at 12.  
 9. See id.  
 10. Bureau of Transp. Statistics, 2018 Traffic Data for U.S. Airlines and Foreign Airlines U.S. 
Flights, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.bts.dot.gov/newsroom/2018-traffic-data-us-airlines-and-
foreign-airlines-us-flights (March 21, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PY9A-K9FW].  
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). 
 12. See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cope, 
676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 2019).  
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United States v. Johnson13  and Congress’s decision to enact section 
3237(a) as a direct response to the Johnson decision. Section B then 
details the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Rodriguez-
Moreno14 and Ashcroft v. ACLU15 following the passage of section 
3237(a). Section C summarizes the federal circuit courts’ various 
interpretations of section 3237(a). Lastly, Section D details and 
compares the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Breitweiser,16 the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cope,17 
and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Lozoya.18 
A.  An Early Look at Venue: The Supreme Court’s Decision in United 
States v. Johnson and Congress’ Legislative Response 
In United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court was tasked with 
determining the outcome of a rarely litigated issue: venue.19 The issue 
in Johnson was whether several defendants charged with violating the 
Federal Denture Act were properly tried in Delaware.20 While located 
in Illinois, the defendants violated the Act by mailing dentures to 
Delaware that were cast by a person not licensed to practice dentistry 
in Delaware.21 The Court reasoned that Congress possesses the 
authority to insert venue provisions into criminal statutes that define 
the underlying crime as a continuing offense.22 The continuing offense 
may then be tried in any district through which the offense moved.23 
However, the Court noted that determinations of venue in criminal 
cases “are not merely matters of formal legal procedure” but involve 
“deep issues of public policy.”24 Thus, when the venue provision of a 
criminal statute equally permits a defendant to be tried in the specific 
district where the crime occurred and in every district through which 
the crime moved, courts must interpret the venue provision narrowly 
to permit trial only in the specific district where the crime was 
committed.25 The more restrictive interpretation of venue provisions 
 
 13. 323 U.S. 273 (1944). 
 14. 526 U.S. 275 (1999). 
 15. 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
 16. 357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 17. 676 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 18. 920 F.3d. 1231 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 19. 323 U.S. at 274.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 273-74.  
 22. Id. at 275.  
 23. Id.   
 24. Id. at 275-76.  
 25. Id.  
3
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in Johnson is consistent with the policy considerations underlying the 
venue safeguards included in the Constitution.26 Because Congress did 
not include a specific venue provision in the Federal Denture Act, the 
Court concluded that the Federal Denture Act was reasonably 
susceptible to either interpretation.27 Therefore, the Court held that 
under the Federal Denture Act, a defendant must be tried in the specific 
district in which the mailing of the illegal dentures occurred and, thus, 
in the present case, venue was not proper in Delaware.28 
Congress passed section 3237(a) in direct response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johnson.29 Section 3237(a) provides that “any 
offense against the United States begun in one district and completed 
in another, or committed in more than one district” may be tried in 
“any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or 
completed.” Additionally, the second paragraph of the statue provides 
that “any offense involving the use of the mails, transportation in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or the importation of an object or 
person into the United States is a continuing offense” that may be tried 
“in any district from, through, or into which such commerce, mail 
matter, or imported object or person moves.”30 Capitalizing on the 
congressional authority the Court recognized in Johnson, Congress 
passed section 3237(a) as a specific venue provision that would 
remove all doubt as to whether offenses such as the mailing of dentures 
in violation of the Federal Denture Act are to be considered continuing 
offenses that may be tried in any district in which the offense 
occurred.31 In this way, Congress precluded the Court from narrowly 
interpreting the Federal Denture Act and similar criminal offenses 
involving the use of the mails or transportation in interstate commerce 
to only allow a defendant to be tried in the specific district in which 
the crime began.32  
B.  The Supreme Court’s Venue Decisions After Section 3237(a) 
In United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, the Supreme Court 
determined whether venue in a prosecution for using or carrying a 
firearm in a kidnapping was proper in any district in which the 
 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 276-78. 
 28. Id.   
 29. United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Reviser’s Note, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3237(a)).  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
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kidnapping was committed, or only in the single district in which the 
firearm was used during the kidnapping.33 The defendant, Rodriguez-
Moreno, was hired by a disgruntled drug distributor to locate a rival 
dealer who had stolen the distributor’s cocaine.34 The distributor 
instructed Rodriguez-Moreno to kidnap the dealer’s middleman for 
leverage during the search.35 Rodriguez-Moreno kidnapped the 
middleman in Texas and held the middleman captive as he drove to 
Maryland through Texas, New Jersey, and New York.36 While in 
Maryland, Rodriguez-Moreno took possession of a firearm and put the 
firearm to the back of the middleman’s head, threatening to shoot 
him.37 Rodriguez-Moreno was charged with using and carrying a 
firearm in relation to kidnapping.38 Although the government only 
proved that Rodriguez-Moreno used the firearm in Maryland, he was 
tried in the District of New Jersey.39 The Court reasoned that to 
determine the locus delicti40 of a crime, courts must first determine the 
nature of the crime by “identify[ing] the conduct constituting the 
offense … and then discern  the location of the commission of the 
criminal acts.”41 Applying this standard, the Court determined that the 
charged offense consisted of two conduct elements: the using of a 
firearm and the commission of a kidnapping.42 The Court reasoned that 
kidnapping is a continuing offense because kidnapping does not occur 
within a discrete point in time, but instead, continues until the victim 
is free.43 In addressing the location element of the venue inquiry, the 
Court relied on its previous ruling in United States v. Lombardo, where 
the Court reasoned that “‘where a crime consists of distinct parts which 
have different localities, the whole may be tried where any part can be 
proved to have been done.’”44 Therefore, the Court held that venue in 
New Jersey was proper because the charged offense consisted of both 
the using of the firearm and the kidnapping.45 Kidnapping is a 
 
 33. 526 U.S. 275, 276 (1999).  
 34. Id. at 276-77.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 277.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Locus delecti is a Latin term meaning the “scene of the crime.” It refers to the location where 
a criminal offense was committed. Locus delecti, USLEGAL.COM, https://definitions.uslegal.com/l/locus-
delicti/ [https://perma.cc/ZF2F-J5TE].  
 41. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279 (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6-7 
(1998)).  
 42. Id. at 280.  
 43. Id. at 281.  
 44. Id. (quoting United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 60 (1916)).  
 45. Id. at 282.  
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continuous offense which could be properly tried in any state in which 
any part of it took place, including New Jersey.46 Thus, the entire 
charged offense could be properly tried in New Jersey because one 
distinct part of the offense could be tried in New Jersey.47 
In Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Supreme Court determined whether the 
Child Online Protection Act’s (“COPA”) use of community standards 
to identify material that is harmful to minors violated the First 
Amendment.48 Although the case dealt with a legal issue unrelated to 
venue, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided a rare glimpse into the 
Court’s interpretation of section 3237(a).49 In particular, because 
COPA does not include an explicit venue provision, Justice Kennedy 
reasoned that venue under the Act may be governed by section 
3237(a).50 Justice Kennedy concluded that a violation of COPA does, 
in fact, fall within the scope of section 3237(a) because “the Act’s 
prohibition includes an interstate commerce element” and, thus, 
qualifies as an “offense involving … transportation in interstate … 
commerce” that may be tried “in any district from, through, or into 
which such commerce … moves.”51 In this way, Justice Kennedy 
indicated that, in order to constitute an “offense involving . . . interstate 
… commerce” within the meaning of section 3237(a), interstate 
commerce must be one of the elements of the offense.52  
C.  The Circuit Courts’ Interpretations of Section 3237(a) 
The federal circuit courts are split as to whether an offense involving  
transportation in interstate  commerce as used in section 3237(a) 
encompasses any offense that takes place on a form of transportation 
in interstate commerce or only refers to offenses in which 
transportation in interstate commerce is one of the conduct elements 
of the offense.53 
In United States v. McCulley, the Eleventh Circuit determined 
whether a defendant who had stowed himself away in the cargo hold 
of an airplane and stolen from the United States mail could be properly 
tried in the district in which the airplane landed.54 The defendant 
 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002).  
 49. See id. at 601-02.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. See id.  
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).  
 54. 673 F.2d 346, 348-49 (11th Cir. 1982).  
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boarded a non-stop flight from Los Angeles to Atlanta by locking 
himself inside a suitcase.55 During the flight, the defendant opened the 
suitcase and began to loot several United States mail bags located 
inside the cargo hold.56 After being discovered and apprehended in 
Atlanta, the defendant was tried and convicted of stealing mail in the 
Northern District of Georgia.57 The court concluded that, under section 
3237(a), any criminal offense committed on a form of transportation 
in interstate commerce is a continuing offense that may be properly 
tried in any district “from, through, or into which” the transportation 
in interstate commerce moved.58 The court reasoned that Congress 
enacted section 3237(a) to ensure that defendants who commit crimes 
while traveling in interstate commerce do not avoid prosecution 
merely because of a lack of venue.59 Therefore, the court held that the 
charged offense fell within the scope of section 3237(a) because the 
defendant committed the offense while traveling on an airplane.60 As 
such, venue was proper in the Northern District of Georgia, the district 
in which the airplane had landed.61 
In contrast, the Second Circuit concluded that section 3237(a) 
applies to an offense only when transportation in interstate commerce 
is itself an element of the offense.62 Specifically, in United States v. 
Brennan, the Second Circuit determined whether defendants charged 
with mail fraud could be properly tried in the district through which 
the fraudulent mail traveled.63 The court noted that Congress enacted 
section 3237(a) in direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Johnson, which held that the offense of using “the mails or any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce” to send dentures into a state 
that were cast by a person not licensed to practice dentistry in that state 
must be prosecuted in the specific district in which the mailing of the 
illegal dentures occurred.64 Thus, the court reasoned that Congress 
intended section 3237(a) to address the narrow issue of venue in 
offenses analogous to the offense at issue in Johnson—offenses in 
which use of the mails or an instrumentality of interstate commerce is 
an element of the offense.65 Therefore, the court held that section 
 
 55. Id. at 348.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 348-49.  
 58. Id. at 349-50.  
 59. Id. at 350.  
 60. Id.   
 61. Id.  
 62. United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1999).  
 63. Id. at 144.  
 64. Id. at 146 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1821).  
 65. Id. at 147.  
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3237(a) did not apply to the offense of mail fraud because the elements 
of the offense merely involved “acts of depositing or receiving mail, 
or causing it to be delivered, rather than by the more general and 
ongoing act of ‘using the mails.’”66 As such, the court concluded that 
mail fraud was not a “continuing offense” within the meaning of 
section 3237(a) and, thus, the defendants could not be properly tried in 
any district through which the mail traveled but only in the districts in 
which the defendants deposited or received the mail.67  
In United States v. Morgan, the D.C. Circuit similarly held that, 
under section 3237(a), an offense is only an “offense involving the use 
of the mails [or] transportation in interstate … commerce” when use 
of the mails or transportation in interstate commerce is one of the 
elements of the offense.68 The court reasoned that because section 
3237(a) employs the term “offense” which refers to a particular crime, 
the language of the statute itself instructs courts to look only to the 
elements of the underlying crime, and not to the circumstances 
surrounding the crime, to determine whether it constitutes an offense 
involving transportation in interstate commerce.69 Therefore, the court 
concluded that crimes committed while a defendant travels in interstate 
commerce, but that do not include transportation in interstate 
commerce as an element of the crime, are not “offenses involving . . . 
transportation in interstate … commerce” for the purposes of section 
3237(a) and, thus, can only be properly tried in the specific district in 
which the crime occurred.70 The court reasoned that an interpretation 
of section 3237(a) as encompassing any crime that occurs in interstate 
commerce would result in an untenable expansion of available venue 
sites under section 3237(a) because almost every criminal offense 
“involves circumstances in which a person or instrumentality related 
to the crime” has traveled in interstate commerce.71 
In United States v. Auernheimer, the Third Circuit further clarified 
that to determine whether an offense is a continuing offense within the 
meaning of section 3237(a), courts must distinguish between the 
essential conduct elements that constitute the charged offense and the 
circumstance elements which are merely facts that existed at the time 
the defendant committed the offense.72 The Third Circuit held that only 
 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.   
 68. 393 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 200-01.  
 72. 748 F.3d 525, 533 (3d Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  
8
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essential conduct elements can serve as a basis for venue.73 As such, 
venue is not proper in a district when only a circumstance element of 
the offense occurred in that district.74  
D.  United States v. Breitweiser, United States v. Cope, and United 
States v. Lozoya 
In United States v. Breitweiser, the Eleventh Circuit determined 
whether a defendant could be properly tried for engaging in abusive 
sexual contact with a minor and assault of a minor while on an airplane 
in the district in which the airplane landed.75 The defendant, 
Breitweiser, boarded a flight from Houston to Atlanta and sat next to 
a fourteen-year-old girl and her eighteen-year-old sister.76 During the 
flight, Breitweiser placed his hand on the fourteen-year-old girl’s leg 
and rubbed it up and down her inner thigh.77 Additionally, the 
fourteen-year-old girl testified that, at some point in the flight, she saw 
Breitweiser masturbating under pillows and a magazine.78 Breitweiser 
was tried and convicted of abusive sexual contact with a minor and 
assault of a minor in the Northern District of Georgia, the district in 
which the plane landed.79  
Relying on the court’s decision in McCulley, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that an offense falls within the scope of section 3237(a) if the 
offense occurred on an instrumentality of interstate commerce.80 The 
Eleventh Circuit dismissed Breitweiser’s argument that venue is only 
proper in the Northern District of Georgia if the government 
establishes that he committed the charged offenses in the airspace 
above the Northern District of Georgia, reasoning that “it would be 
difficult if not impossible for the government to prove . . . exactly 
which federal district was beneath the plane when Breitweiser 
committed the crimes.”81 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that an 
interpretation of section 3237(a) that imposes such a great burden on 
the government to establish proper venue for a crime committed in 
interstate commerce directly contradicts Congress’s intent. Namely, 
Congress intended for section 3237(a) to ensure that crimes committed 
 
 73. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 533.   
 74. Id.  
 75. 357 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 76. Id. at 1252.  
 77. Id.   
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.   
 80. Id. at 1253.  
 81. Id.   
9
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in interstate commerce will not escape prosecution for lack of venue.82 
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit determined that to establish venue 
under section 3237(a), the government need only show that the 
defendant committed the charged offense while traveling in interstate 
commerce.83 Thus, because Breitweiser committed the charged 
offenses while flying on an airplane, under section 3237(a), the 
government could properly prosecute him in “any district from, 
through, or into which” the airplane moved, including the Northern 
District of Georgia.84 
In United States v. Cope, the Tenth Circuit similarly held that an 
“offense involving … transportation in interstate … commerce,” as 
used in section 3237(a), refers to any criminal offense committed on a 
mode of transportation in interstate commerce.85 The defendant, Cope, 
was a co-pilot on a commercial flight from Texas to Colorado.86 
During the flight, Cope’s captain smelled alcohol in the cockpit and 
eventually discovered that the smell was coming from Cope.87 After 
the plane landed in Colorado, Cope took a breathalyzer test that 
revealed he was inebriated.88 Cope was tried and convicted of 
operating a common carrier while under the influence of alcohol in the 
District of Colorado.89 The Tenth Circuit concluded that because Cope 
was under the influence of alcohol during a flight traveling in interstate 
commerce, under section 3237(a), venue was proper in any district 
through which the flight traveled, including the District of Colorado.90 
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that because section 3237(a) encompasses 
any offense committed while traveling in interstate commerce, the 
government was not required to show that Cope was under the 
influence of alcohol specifically in Colorado.91 Rather, the undisputed 
evidence that Cope was under the influence of alcohol during the flight 
was sufficient to establish that, under section 3237(a), venue was 
proper in the District of Colorado.92  
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Lozoya held that, 
under section 3237(a), an offense only qualifies as an “offense 
involving … transportation in interstate … commerce” when traveling 
 
 82. Id. at 1253-54.  
 83. Id.   
 84. Id.  
 85. 676 F.3d, 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 86. Id. at 1221.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 1222.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 1225.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
10
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in interstate commerce is one of the elements of the offense.93 In 
Lozoya, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether the proper 
venue for an assault committed on an airplane was the district in which 
the airplane landed.94 During a commercial flight from Minneapolis to 
Los Angeles, the defendant, Lozoya, was unable to sleep because the 
passenger sitting behind her, Wolff, constantly bumped her seat.95 
Later in the flight, Lozoya confronted Wolff and, after a heated 
exchange, Lozoya hit Wolff in the face with her hand, causing his nose 
to bleed.96 Lozoya was tried and convicted of assault in the district 
where the flight had landed, the Central District of California.97 
Applying the two-pronged test set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Rodriguez-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit found that the only essential 
conduct element of the charged offense was the assault.98 Because the 
assault did not occur within the Central District of California, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that, under Rodriguez-Moreno, the offense could not 
be properly tried in that district.99  
The Ninth Circuit next turned to the government’s argument that 
venue was proper in the Central District of California under section  
3237(a).100 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the first paragraph of 
section 3237(a) did not confer venue in the Central District of 
California because that provision applies only to continuing offenses 
that are committed across multiple districts and Lozoya’s assault was 
a point-in-time offense that “occurred in an instant and likely in the 
airspace of only one district.”101 Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the second paragraph of section 3237(a) also did not confer venue 
in the Central District of California because, although the assault 
occurred on an airplane, travel in interstate commerce is not itself an 
element of assault.102 The court reasoned that, even if the fact that the 
crime occurred on an airplane is construed as an element of the assault, 
it would be a circumstance element rather than a conduct element of 
the offense, which cannot provide a basis for venue.103 Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit held that Lozoya could be properly tried only in the 
 
 93. 920 F.3d 1231, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 94. Id. at 1238.  
 95. Id. at 1233.  
 96. Id. at 1233-34.  
 97. Id. at 1235-36.  
 98. Id. at 1239.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1240.  
 103. Id. 
11
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specific district above which the assault occurred.104 Thus, because the 
assault did not occur above the Central District of California, venue in 
that district was improper.105 
 The Ninth Circuit recognized that its interpretation of section 
3237(a) conflicted with that of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits but 
concluded that the reasoning of the other circuits was flawed because 
both circuits failed to evaluate the nature of the conduct constituting 
the offense as required by the two-pronged Rodriguez-Moreno test 
and, instead, focused on the practical difficulties of requiring the 
government to prove exactly which district the plane was flying over 
when the crime occurred.106  
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized the “creeping absurdity in 
[its] holding,” the court concluded that the clear mandate of the 
Constitution and the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez-Moreno 
trumped the practical concerns expressed by the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits.107 The Ninth Circuit noted that it is within the authority of 
Congress, rather than the courts, to address “any irrationality that 
might follow from the [court’s] conclusion” by enacting legislation 
that establishes a more practical and workable standard for 
determining venue when a crime occurs during a flight.108  
The dissent in Lozoya disagreed with the majority’s interpretation 
of the second paragraph of section 3237(a), arguing that the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits were correct in holding that an “offense involving 
… transportation in interstate … commerce” encompasses any crime 
committed while traveling in interstate commerce.109 The dissent 
reasoned that the majority’s construction of section 3237(a) makes 
prosecuting in-flight crimes nearly impossible and may even result in 
the infliction of further harm to victims by requiring them to recount 
the exact moment when a traumatic crime occurred.110 Additionally, 
the dissent argued that requiring the prosecution of an in-flight crime 
in “a ‘flyover state’ where the defendant and potential witnesses have 
no ties” does not serve the fundamental purpose of venue to protect a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.111 Further, allowing an in-flight crime 
to be prosecuted in the district in which the flight lands does not 
necessarily disadvantage the defendant or undermine the defendant’s 
 
 104. Id. at 1243.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 1240-41.  
 107. Id. at 1242-43.  
 108. Id. at 1243.  
 109. Id. at 1244.  
 110. Id. at 1244-45.  
 111. Id. 
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right to a fair trial.112 Thus, the dissent concluded that the majority’s 
interpretation of section 3237(a) is entirely inconsistent with 
Congress’s intent in enacting the statute.113  
III. DISCUSSION 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the correct interpretation of section 
3237(a) in Lozoya. Although the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
misidentified the difference between its own determination of proper 
venue for in-flight crimes and that of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’, 
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of an offense involving the use of 
transportation in interstate commerce is consistent with Congress’s 
legislative purpose in enacting section 3237(a).  Further, the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) adheres to the narrow 
construction of venue provisions set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Johnson. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Ashcroft v. ACLU also 
lends support to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) 
by suggesting that the Supreme Court tends to interpret the term “any 
offense involving the use of … transportation in interstate … 
commerce” in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lozoya. 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) adheres to 
the distinction between circumstance elements and essential conducts 
elements of a criminal offense drawn by the Third Circuit for the 
purposes of establishing proper venue. Although the dissent in Lozoya 
raises valid concerns regarding the feasibility of the majority’s 
interpretation of section 3237(a), Congress—not the judiciary—has 
the authority to amend the language of the statute or enact a new venue 
statute to address the practical difficulties of establishing proper venue 
for point in time offenses committed while traveling in interstate 
commerce.  
A.  The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Lozoya misidentifies the source of 
the current circuit split  
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Lozoya regarding the difference 
between its own determination of proper venue for in-flight crimes and 
that of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ is erroneous. In Lozoya, the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its holding contradicted that of the 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ but concluded that neither the Tenth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Cope nor the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
 
 112. Id. at 1245.  
 113. Id. at 1244-45.  
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Breitweiser was persuasive. The Ninth Circuit argued that neither the 
Tenth nor Eleventh Circuits analyzed the essential conduct elements 
of the charged offense when determining the locus delecti of the crime 
and, thus, failed to comply with the first prong of the Rodriguez-
Moreno test. However, the difference between the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits’ conclusion and the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion regarding 
proper venue for in-flight crimes is not, in fact, attributable to 
differences in the Circuits’ application of the Rodriguez-Moreno 
framework. Even if the Tenth  and Eleventh Circuits had been more 
explicit about their application of the Rodriguez-Moreno framework, 
the result in Breitweiser and Cope would have been the same because 
the charged offenses at issue in Breitweiser and Cope were continuing 
offenses while the charged offense at issue in Lozoya was a point-in-
time offense.  
Applying the first prong of the Rodriguez-Moreno test to the facts 
in Breitweiser, the essential conduct elements of the charged offenses 
of abusive sexual contact with a minor and assault of a minor occurred 
continuously throughout the flight rather than in one particular instant 
and, thus, constituted continuous offenses. Therefore, under the second 
prong of the Rodriguez-Moreno test, the charged offense occurred 
across multiple districts and, thus, falls within the scope of the first 
sentence of section 3237(a). As such, the defendant could be properly 
tried in any district in which the offense was begun, continued, or 
completed. Because the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct 
throughout the flight, the Eleventh Circuit correctly concluded that 
venue was proper in any district from, through, or into which the flight 
traveled.  
Similarly, in Cope, the essential conduct elements of the charged 
offense consisted of operating a commercial airplane while under the 
influence of alcohol which occurred continuously throughout the flight 
as opposed to within a particular instant in time. As such, the charged 
offense was a continuous offense that occurred across multiple 
districts. Therefore, the offense fell within the scope of the first 
sentence of section 3237(a) and venue was proper in any district in 
which the offense was begun, continued, or completed. Because, by 
definition, the charged offense continued throughout the duration of 
the flight, the Tenth Circuit correctly held that the defendant could be 
tried in any district from, through, or into which the flight traveled.  
In contrast, the charged offense of assault in Lozoya was a point-in-
time offense rather than a continuous offense because the essential 
conduct element of the assault, the defendant’s act of punching her 
fellow passenger in the nose, occurred in a single instant in time and, 
thus, in a single location and district. Unlike in Breitweiser and Cope, 
14
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the charged offense in Lozoya did not fall within the scope of the first 
sentence of section 3237(a). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was mistaken 
in attributing the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions regarding the 
proper venue for in-flight crimes to their failure to apply the two-
pronged Rodriguez-Moreno test. Even if the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits had more explicitly employed the Rodriguez-Moreno test, the 
circuits would have arrived at the exact same conclusions.  
The difference between the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ conclusion 
and the Ninth Circuits’ conclusion is actually attributable to the 
circuits’ varied interpretations of what is required to invoke the second 
sentence of section 3237(a). Specifically, in Lozoya, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that, in order to be considered an offense involving 
interstate commerce under section 3237(a), it is not sufficient for the 
charged offense to have merely occurred on an airplane, but rather, 
travel in interstate commerce must be one of the elements of the 
charged offense itself. In contrast, in Cope and Breitweiser, the Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits determined that to qualify as an offense 
involving interstate commerce under section 3237(a), the charged 
offense need only have occurred on an instrument of interstate 
commerce. Had the Ninth Circuit in Lozoya applied the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation of an offense involving interstate 
commerce, the Ninth Circuit would have reached the same conclusion 
as the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. Because the charged offense of 
assault occurred on an airplane traveling in interstate commerce, the 
defendant could be properly tried in any district from, through, or into 
which the airplane traveled. Therefore, rather than originating from the 
circuits’ differing applications of the Rodriguez-Moreno framework, 
the circuit split created by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lozoya 
originates from the circuits’ distinct interpretations of what constitutes 
an offense involving interstate commerce within the meaning of 
section 3237(a).  
B.  The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) in Lozoya is 
consistent with Congress’s legislative intent  
Although the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as to the source of the 
current circuit split is erroneous, the Ninth Circuit, nonetheless, 
adopted the correct interpretation of section 3237(a) in Lozoya. In 
particular, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) best 
serves Congress’s legislative intent in enacting the statute. Congress 
passed section 3237(a). As noted by the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Brennan, because use of the mail or an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce was an element of the charged offense at issue in 
15
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Johnson, it appears that Congress intended section 3237(a) to apply 
only to offenses in which interstate commerce or use of the mail is 
actually an element of the offense rather than to any criminal offense 
that happens to be committed on a mode of transportation in interstate 
commerce. As such, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the in-flight 
assault charged in Lozoya was not an offense involving interstate 
commerce is consistent with Congress’s intent that section 3237(a) 
applies only where traveling in interstate commerce is one of the 
elements of the offense. Traveling in interstate commerce is not an 
element of assault, so assault was not in the purview of the crimes 
contemplated by Congress when enacting section 3237(a).114  
In contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation of 
section 3237(a) is entirely inconsistent with Congress’s legislative 
intent in enacting the venue statute.  In Cope and Breitweiser, the 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ conclusion that an offense involving 
interstate commerce—as used in section 3237(a)—encompasses any 
criminal offense committed on a mode of transportation in interstate 
commerce wholly overlooks the direct relationship between Johnson 
and Congress’ decision to enact section 3237(a). In addressing the 
legislative intent behind section 3237(a), neither the Tenth nor 
Eleventh Circuit discussed the legislative history of the statute as a 
direct reaction to the Court’s decision in Johnson, but rather blindly 
relied on the reasoning provided in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. McCulley. In McCulley, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that Congress intended section 3237(a) to serve as a 
“catchall provision” designed to ensure that crimes committed while 
traveling in interstate commerce did not avoid prosecution simply 
because of a lack of venue.115 However, the Eleventh Circuit provided 
no substantive evidence from the statute’s plain language or legislative 
history to support this assertion. Instead, in support of its 
interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit merely provided citations to 
analogous venue statutes enacted by state legislatures which are 
largely irrelevant to the specific question of Congress’s intent in 
enacting section 3237(a).  
Further, in Breitweiser, the Eleventh Circuit not only blindly 
adhered to the reasoning provided in McCulley, but also mistakenly 
relied on pure policy-based reasoning to support its interpretation of 
section 3237(a). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that 
section 3237(a) must apply to any crime that occurs during travel in 
interstate commerce because an interpretation of section 3237(a) that 
 
 114. “An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury 
on the person of another.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (Deering 2019).  
 115. United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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requires the government to prove exactly which federal district was 
underneath the plane precisely when the defendant committed the 
crime would impose a great burden on the government in establishing 
proper venue for in-flight crimes that Congress could not have possibly 
intended when enacting the statute. Regardless of whether the practical 
difficulties raised by the Eleventh Circuit are valid, these issues of 
policy are for the legislature, rather than the courts, to decide.116 By 
explicitly enacting section 3237(a) in direct response to the Court’s 
decision in Johnson, Congress signaled that it has decided that the 
great public interest in maintaining venue as a constitutional protection 
for criminal defendants outweighs policy concerns regarding the 
practical difficulties imposed on the state in determining proper venue 
for in-flight crimes. In this way, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
interpretation of section 3237(a) is not founded on actual evidence of 
legislative intent but merely on the unsubstantiated conclusions set 
forth in McCulley and various policy concerns better suited for the 
legislature than the judiciary. Therefore, in neglecting to consider the 
relationship between Congress’s enactment of section 3237(a) and the 
Court’s decision in Johnson, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits adopted 
an interpretation of section 3237(a) that is wholly inconsistent with 
Congress’s true legislative intent in enacting the venue statute.  
C.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Ashcroft v. ACLU support the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of section 3237(a)  
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) best comports 
with the narrow construction of venue provisions set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Johnson. Applying the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
interpretation of venue provisions to section 3237(a) suggests that 
courts should not interpret the statute to apply broadly to any crime 
that occurs during travel in interstate commerce, but only to the narrow 
class of offenses in which travel in interstate commerce is an element 
of the offense itself. Specifically, because the term offense involving 
the use of  transportation in interstate commerce is ambiguous and 
undefined, the statute can reasonably be interpreted to apply either to 
any crime that occurs during travel in interstate commerce or only to 
crimes in which travel in interstate commerce is an element of the 
offense.117 Because the language of  3237(a) is reasonably susceptible 
 
 116. See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275-77 (1944).  
 117. See Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 8 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z3GM-E2BK]. 
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to either interpretation, the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson 
instructs courts to interpret the statute narrowly as applying only where 
travel in interstate commerce is an element of the underlying criminal 
offense. As explained by the Court in Johnson, this restrictive 
interpretation of section 3237(a) best ensures that the venue safeguards 
the Framer’s included in the Constitution continue to protect the rights 
of criminal defendants.  
In contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ decision to adopt a 
broad interpretation of offense involving transportation in interstate 
commerce as referring to any crime committed during travel in 
interstate commerce entirely disregards the Supreme Court’s mandate 
in Johnson. Consequently, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions 
undermine the constitutional policy underlying the venue safeguards 
the Framer’s intended to protect the rights of criminal defendants. 
Thus, in light of Johnson, the Ninth Circuit, rather than the Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits, adopted the correct interpretation of section 
3237(a).  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justice Souter and Justice 
Ginsburg, in Ashcroft v. ACLU lends additional support to the narrow 
interpretation of section 3237(a) adopted by the Ninth Circuit in 
Lozoya. Like the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy evaluated whether 
section 3237(a) governed venue for a violation of COPA by looking to 
the elements of a COPA offense and determining whether they 
expressly included transportation in interstate commerce. Contrary to 
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions in Cope and Breitweiser, 
Justice Kennedy’s inquiry into the application of section 3237(a) to a 
COPA violation included no consideration of whether a COPA offense 
may happen to occur during transportation in interstate commerce. 
Additionally, Justice Kennedy concluded that a violation of COPA 
constitutes an offense involving the use of transportation in interstate 
commerce within the meaning of section 3237(a) specifically because 
travel in interstate commerce is an element of the offense. Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence supports the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that 
courts should interpret section 3237(a) to apply only where travel in 
interstate commerce is an element of the charged offense itself. 
Although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Ashcroft v. ACLU only 
provides insight into a few of the justice’s interpretations of section 
3237(a), when considered in conjunction with the foregoing evidence, 
it nonetheless suggests that, should the Court decide to review this 
circuit split, the Court is more likely to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
restrictive interpretation of section 3237(a) than the Tenth  and 
Eleventh Circuit’s expansive interpretation of section 3237(a) as 
correct.  
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D.  The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) ensures that 
only the essential conduct elements of a criminal offense serve as a basis 
for venue  
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) is also 
consistent with the Third Circuit’s holding in Auernheimer that only 
the essential conduct elements of an offense may serve as a basis for 
venue. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 
3237(a) requires courts to determine whether an offense constitutes an 
offense involving the use of transportation in interstate  commerce by 
looking to the essential conduct elements of the underlying criminal 
offense and determining whether travel in interstate commerce is one 
of those essential conduct elements. Consistent with the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Auernheimer, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
section 3237(a) ensures that only the essential conduct elements of the 
underlying criminal offense serve as a basis for venue.  
In contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation of 
section 3237(a) allows courts to determine that an offense constitutes 
an offense involving transportation in interstate commerce by merely 
looking to the circumstance elements surrounding the commission of 
the crime and discerning whether the crime took place on an 
instrument of interstate commerce. Thus, contrary to the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Auernheimer, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
interpretation of section 3237(a) permits a finding of proper venue in 
a district in which only a circumstance element of the offense—travel 
in interstate commerce—occurred in that district. The Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the statute adheres to this distinction between 
circumstance elements and conduct elements of a criminal offense for 
the purpose of venue.  
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit adopted the correct interpretation of 
section 3237(a) in Lozoya. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation best 
serves Congress’s legislative intent in enacting section 3237(a) and is 
most consistent with the restrictive interpretation of venue provisions 
set forth by the Supreme Court in Johnson. Additionally, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Ashcroft v. ACLU indicates that the 
Supreme Court is more likely to interpret section 3237(a) in 
accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lozoya. Further, the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) is consistent with the 
Third Circuit’s holding in Auernheimer that only essential conduct 
elements of an offense may provide a basis for venue.  
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E.  The practical concerns raised by the dissent in Lozoya must be 
resolved by legislative, rather than judicial, action  
The dissent in Lozoya raises valid issues regarding the feasibility 
and “‘creeping absurdity’” of the majority’s interpretation of section 
3237(a). For example, under the Ninth Circuit’s narrow construction 
of an offense involving transportation in interstate commerce, in order 
to properly prosecute a crime that occurred on a flight from New York 
to Los Angeles, the state would have to pinpoint exactly which out of 
the hundreds of districts the flight flew over the plane was flying above 
at the exact moment when the crime was committed. In cases involving 
crimes of sexual abuse or misconduct, like Breitweiser, this would 
require victims to relive their traumatic experiences in order to recount 
exactly when the crime occurred. Further, in instances where the state 
is unable to pinpoint the exact location of the crime or lacks the 
resources to engage in the extensive investigation necessary to 
determine the exact location, serious criminal offenses will go 
unprosecuted merely because they happened to occur while traveling 
in interstate commerce.  
However, these policy considerations are within the purview of 
Congress, not the courts. As evidenced by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Johnson, the legislature, not the judiciary, has the authority 
to enact venue provisions that define particular crimes as continuing 
offenses that may be tried in any district from, through, or into which 
the offense was committed. In fact, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Johnson indicated that in cases where the language of a venue 
provision is ambiguous, the role of the courts is limited to strictly 
construing the venue provision as enacted by Congress in order to 
protect criminal defendants’ constitutional right to a fair trial. Further, 
the relationship between the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson and 
Congress’s subsequent enactment of section 3237(a) suggests that 
where Congress perceives that the courts’ strict interpretation of a 
venue provision creates practical difficulties or policy concerns, it is 
Congress’s role to pass a new venue provision that addresses and 
resolves these concerns. It is this pattern that should be followed here.  
Due to the practical difficulties that arise when the state is required 
to prosecute in-flight offenses that fall outside the scope of section 
3237(a) in the exact district above which the offense occurred, 
Congress should enact a new venue statute or amend section 3237(a) 
to address proper venue for crimes that merely occur while traveling 
in interstate commerce. However, until Congress decides to address 
this venue issue, it is the role of the courts to strictly construe the 
language of section 3237(a) and apply it only to offenses in which 
traveling in interstate commerce is an element of the offense itself. 
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/8
2020] VENUE FOR CRIMES ON COMMERCIAL CARRIERS 1187 
Therefore, although the dissent raises valid concerns regarding the 
practical effects of the majority’s decision, the Ninth Circuit correctly 
adopted a narrow interpretation of section 3237(a) regardless of its 
own concerns regarding the “creeping absurdity” of its decision, and 
properly invited Congress to address the issue of venue for in-flight 
crimes.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the correct interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 
3237(a) in Lozoya because Congress, not the courts, possesses the 
authority to legislate. Therefore, courts must apply legislation as 
written and conclude that all in-flight offenses should be treated as 
continuing offenses that may be properly tried in any district from, 
through, or into which the airplane traveled.  
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly adopted an interpretation that 
adheres to Congress’s legislative intent in enacting section 3237(a), 
Congress should take heed of the legitimate practical difficulties that 
arise from the statute’s limited application and take action either to 
amend section 3237(a) or enact a new venue statute that addresses the 
venue issues created by in-flight criminal offenses. For example, 
insisting that an in-flight crime be prosecuted in the exact district 
above which the offense occurred does not actually protect criminal 
defendants’ rights as contemplated by the Framers; instead, this is 
actually more likely to result in the very infringement of a criminal 
defendant’s rights that the Framers sought to avoid, forcing criminal 
defendants to defend themselves in foreign districts where they have 
no ties.  Further, not only does the current legislative regime provide 
insufficient protection to criminal defendants, but it also allows 
criminal offenses to go unprosecuted merely because of the great 
difficulty of establishing proper venue. Because of the sheer number 
of districts over which an airplane flies during a single flight, 
pinpointing the exact district over which an offense occurred is 
extremely difficult and may require the prosecutor to ask victims of 
violent crimes or sexual assault and misconduct to recall painful events 
in excruciating detail. The difficulty of this task combined with the 
limited resources and time possessed by most prosecutor’s offices118 
almost ensures that a great deal of in-flight crimes will avoid 
prosecution for lack of proper venue. In the future, this issue will 
become more prevalent if the number of in-flight crimes committed 
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continues its upward trend.119  
For these reasons, although the Ninth Circuit correctly adopted an 
interpretation that adheres to Congress’s legislative intent in enacting 
section 3237(a), Congress should take action either to amend section 
3237(a) or enact a new venue statute that addresses the venue issues 
created by in-flight criminal offenses.  
 
 
 119. See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 10. 
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